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SOME ASPECTS OF THE CANADIAN BILL
OF RIGHTS: AN AMERICAN VIEW
ROGER A. PAULEY":
Introduction
The Canadian Bill of Rights,1 unlike its American counterpart,
is a statute, enacted by the Parliament of Canada on August 10, 1960.
As such it does not bind the Dominion government as the United
States Bill of Rights binds Congress and is subject to repeal, explicit
or implied, by a subsequent legislative Act.2
After a brief preamble, "affirming", among other things, the
"dignity and worth of the human person" and proclaiming that the
"Canadian Nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge the
supremacy of God", the Bill continues:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of
race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights
and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and
enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protec-
tion of the law;
(c) freedom of religion;
(d) freedom of speech;
* Mr. Pauley, a graduate of the Harvard Law School and member of
the New York State Bar, is presently a candidate for the LL.M. degree at
the London School of Economics and Political Science (England).
1 8 and 9 Eliz. II, c. 44.
2 I should make clear at the outset that I do not propose to discuss,
apart from this note, whether the Bill is constitutional. Much of it, including
most of Section 2, (see appendix for text of Bill) seems to me undeniably
within the powers of the Dominion Parliament under Section 91(27) (criminal
law and procedure) of the British North America Act. As for the rest, since
the Bill purports to extend only to Dominion legislation, (see infra, pp. 3-5),
it too is probably constitutional. But caution: should the Bill become a
vehicle for changing the character of the legislation to which it applies to
legislation essentially concerning individual liberties against the government,
it might well be void as encroaching upon the exclusive capacity of the
provinces to legislate upon the subjects of "Property and Civil Rights".
B.N.A. Act, s. 92(13).
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(e) freedom of assembly and association; and
(f) freedom of the press.3
There then follows the vital Section 2 of the Act with its peculiar
and ambiguous phraseology:
2. Every law of Canada shall ... be so construed and applied as not
to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridg-
ment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized
and declared, [i.e. those in Section 1] and in particular, no law of Canada
shall be construed or applied so as to ...
and there ensues a list of rights, which I shall not here enumerate,4
mainly to do with the basic guarantees connected with arrest, deten-
tion and procedures at a criminal trial, but also providing for a "fair
hearing" for the determination of a person's rights and obligations.
Two problems immediately arise with regard to the interpreta-
tion of this Section. The first and most important concerns the strange
juxtaposition, in two places in the text, of the terms "construed" and
"applied" which appear, upon reflection, to contradict each other.
To illustrate, if emphasis is put upon the word "applied", it seems
evidence that the Section was intended to repeal all portions of
existing statutes found to be inconsistent with its terms; while on
the other hand if stress is placed upon the word "construed", the
conclusion seems equally inescapable that the Section was designed
only to provide a rule of construction in the event ambiguity is dis-
covered in the language of another enactment which bears upon the
rights embraced. 5 Faced with this initial and crucial interpretative
dilemma, the Canadian courts have thus far failed to make a definite
choice, though indications are that the Section will be held not to
have a repealing effect.6
3 Because of the repeated use of the terms "human" and "individual"
in Section 1, the Bill has been held inapplicable to a trade union, Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers Union v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 657(B.C.S.C.), aff'd uithout discussion of point in (1962), 38 W.W.R. 533(B.C.C.A.) and in [19631 S.C.R. 584, and apparently does not extend to
corporations either. This is an important limitation, especially on the rights
not to be deprived of property without due process of law nor be denied the
equal protection of the law. In the United States corporations are "persons"
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the purposes of both the corresponding
constitutional provisions: Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co.(1886), 118 U.S. 394 (equal protection); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Beckwith (1889), 129 U.S. 26 (due process); and note cases and discussion in
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander (1949), 337 U.S. 562, at pp. 574 et seq.
4 See appendix for complete text of Section.
5 See D. A. Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada (1964), pp. 38, 39.
6 E.g. 1. v. Goldstein (1961), 34 W.W.R. 236 (B.C. Mag. Ct.); R?. v. Gon-
zales (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290, at p. 292 (B.C.C.A.) (dictum) (Davey J.A.
concurring); contra Cartwright J., dissenting, in Robertson & Rosetanni v.
The Queen (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 485, at p. 489 (S.C.C.).
Such a holding would have the approval of Bora (now Mr. Justice)
Laskin, who argues in his article, Canada's Bill of Rights (1961), 11 Intl &
Comp. L. Q. 519, that since the Bill purports (by Section 5(2)) to apply
identically to future as well as existing legislation, it cannot have been in-
tended to have a repealing effect because its enactors must have realized
their inherent inability to bind a successor Parliament. This is certainly a
valid point, but not all the inferences that can be drawn from the Bill support
this position. For example, it is plain that the word "applied" was not inserted[footnote continued on next page.]
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Quite apart from this issue, moreover, there remains the question
of the meaning of the phrase "law of Canada" in Section 2 which
marks the scope of the Bill's application.7 Part II, Section 5(2) of
the Bill of Rights endeavors to define this term. It says:
The expression "law of Canada" in Part I means an Act of the Parliament
of Canada enacted before or after the coming into force of this Act, any
order, rule or regulation thereunder, and any law in force in Canada
or in any part of Canada at the commencement of this Act that is subject
to be repealed, abolished or altered by the Parliament of Canada.
Thus far the Section seems to say simply that the words "law of
Canada" mean any federal statute (or rule, order or regulation
thereunder) now in existence or which comes into being in the future.
But the Section continues, in a separate subheading:
The provisions of Part I shall be construed as extending only to matters
coming within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.8
Does the italicized phrase mean that the Act extends to matters
on which the Parliament of Canada could legislate but has not done
so? A dictum in Re Williams & Williams,9 indicates that provincial
statutes existing in a field in which Parliament also has the power
to act (in that case securities regulation) are not covered. But, as
Mr. Schmeiser is at pains to point out, the Court was there unaware
of the problem posed by the language of Sections 5(2) and 5(3) and
so cannot be taken to have decided the issue. It is suggested, however,
despite Mr. Schmeiser's doubts, that the Bill is restricted to Dominion
statutory provisions. There is no necessity to perceive the two Sections
as being "patently in conflict" as Mr. Schmeiser postulates.'0 Indeed
the fact that a separate paragraph is set aside to define the term
"law of Canada" would indicate fairly conclusively that that definition
was meant to be controlling and the following subsection would seem
more plausibly explained as representing the draftsman's overcautious
attempt to insure that the Bill not be construed to apply to subjects
of exclusive provincial competence. If this view be correct, then it
has at least one additional important consequence-namely that the
Bill does not extend to judicially created rules of law, whether of
merely carelessly in Section 2 from the fact that its Section 2 partner
"construed" appears alone in Sections 5(1) and 5(3). This to me Is at least
some indication that of the pair the term "applied" was meant to carry
the decisive content and that the Section was indeed, therefore, designed tohave a repealing effect on prior inconsistent legislation.
It is even more likely on the cases that Section 1 of the Bill will beheld not to possess repealing ability: Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen,
supra (dictum); R. v. Leach, ex parte Bergsma (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 114(Ont. H.C.), reversed on other grounds, [1966] 1 O.R. 106 (Ont. C.A.). This
would seem to foreclose the question as to Section 2 as well, although onejudge has suggested that there may be a difference in intended repealing
capacity between the two Sections. See Davey J.A. in 1R. v. Gonzales, supra.Why any difference should exist, however, is puzzling in view of the applica-
tion by explicit reference in Section 2 to the Section 1 "rights or freedoms".
See supra, p. 37, or appendix.
7 See p. 2, or appendix for the phrase in context.
8 Italics mine.
9 (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 107, at p. 110 (Ont. C.A.), noted by Schmeiser,
op. Cit., p. 40.10 Schmeiser, op. cit., p. 40.
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a sort which Parliament could validly supersede or not. Nonetheless,
as we shall later observe, the Canadian courts in at least two instances
have treated the Bill as applicable to judicial doctrines without so
much as pausing to justify their action."
A Brief Digression
Having then completed this introduction, it is time now to
launch into a discussion of some of the cases which have arisen under
the Bill. Obviously it will not be possible to refer to, much less to
relate, all the decisions involving the Bill which have been handed
down to date. Therefore I have chosen to confine myself principally
to two areas, selected I confess for no better reason than their interest
to me in light of the comparisons they present to American case law.
The first such area is the admissibility of evidence and the validity
of convictions obtained through methods violating the Bill's pur-
ported guarantee of the right of an accused or detained person to
counsel. The second is the issue of the nature and scope of religious
freedom secured by the Act.
I said "confine myself principally" to these two areas, however,
because first I should like to devote a little space to the study of two
other major decisions involving the Bill of Rights, Guay v. Lafleur,12
and R. v. Gonzales.'3
The first of these concerns Section 2(e), which provides:
No law of Canada shall be so construed or applied so as to . .. (e) de-
prive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and
obligations.
The facts were that pursuant to the Income Tax statute the
defendant Guay, an officer of the Department of National Revenue,
was authorized by the Deputy Minister to investigate the affairs of
the plaintiff Lafleur and thirteen other persons, corporations and
associations with respect to possible violations in the payment of
their income tax. The result of the investigation was to be the filing
of a report to the Minister presumably recommending a course of
action in each instance but not constituting a legally binding order
regarding any of the investigated persons' or entities' possible liabili-
ties under the Income Tax Act. The inquiry began by the defendant
summoning a number of people, Lafleur not among them, to testify
before him under oath on matters concerning those under scrutiny.
The plaintiff then brought an action seeking an injunction against
11 The two cases adverted to are R. v. Steeves (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 335(N.S.S.C.) and . v. O'Connor (1964), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 110 COnt. H.C.), reversed(1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 106 (Ont. C.A.), discussed infra, pp. 41-45. As both the
decisions give restrictive interpretations of the Bill of Rights, it is probable
that the judges concerned applied the Bill through pure oversight. However,
it will be interesting to see whether subsequent courts will seize the oppor-
tunity thus afforded them by the two "precedents" above to enlarge the Bills
effective scope.
12 [1965] S.C.R. 12, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 226.
13 (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (B.C.C.A.).
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the continuance of the proceedings until he was accorded an oppor-
tunity of being present in person and with counsel at the hearings.
The two lower courts granted this relief on the theory that the hear-
ing was quasi-judicial in character and that while Lafleur's rights
might not be conclusively decided by the inquiry, they would cer-
tainly be affected in a practical sense by its outcome. The Supreme
Court of Canada, however, reversed the decision, holding that since
no legally binding order respecting the respondent's rights or obliga-
tions could result from the hearing, Section 2(e) of the Bill of
Rights was inapplicable.14
To my mind it is impossible to quarrel with the Lafleur decision
in view of the stringent word "determination" employed by the statute
itself. Nonetheless I do feel it to be desirable that in solemn in-
vestigations such as the one in the Lafleur case, which can lead at
a later stage to the institution of legal proceedings against a party, a
person whose rights may be affected should have the right to appear
in person throughout the portions of the inquiry relevant to him.15
However, owing to the Lafleur holding, it would seem that a statutory
amendment will be needed to achieve this result.
Of equal if not greater importance in the history of judicial in-
terpretation of the Bill of Rights is the case of R. v. Gonzales.16
Here an Indian was convicted of the offense of possessing liquor off
his reservation in violation of a Dominion statute. He appealed on
the ground that the Act was repugnant to Section 1 (b) of the Bill
of Rights and was therefore of no effect. It will be recalled that
Section 1 (b) provides:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of
race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights
and fundamental freedoms, namely....(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protec-
tion of the law.
The three judges who heard the case in the British Columbia
Court of Appeal were all agreed that the conviction must stand.
Two members of the Court, through an opinion by Tysoe J.A., held
that the phrase "equality before the law" did not deprive Parliament
of the power to pass laws which distinguished on a reasonable basis
between differing groups of persons, but only gave to an individual
the right to remain on the same legal footing as the other members
14 Guay 'v. Lafleur, supra, footnote 12; see also Fauteux J., dissenting,
in Batary v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan, [1965] S.C.R. 465, at p. 468,
where His lordship referred in his opinion to Wolfe v. Robinson (1962), 31D.L.R. (2d) 233 (Ont. C.A.), in which it had been similarly held that counselfor an interested party at a coroner's inquest was not entitled to participatein the proceedings or to cross-examine witnesses, since a coroner's inquest
was not a hearing for the determination of a person's rights or obligations
under Section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.15 See Hall J., dissenting, in Guay v. Lafleur, supra, footnote 12. Nonethe-
less not even the American Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et
seq. (1958), goes this far. Cf. Sections 4 and 5(b) which, however, do notdeal with the type of hearing involved in the Lafleur case.16 Supra, footnote 13.
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of his class for the purposes of a given statute. Since Indians were
a well recognized and distinct category of persons in Canada and
since the Act was designed for their protection as wards of the
Canadian government, there was no denial of "equality before the
law and the protection of the law" within the meaning of the Bill
of Rights.1 7
Davey J.A., concurring, took a different tack. He held that what-
ever the term "equality before the law" might mean and whatever
might be the effect of the rights enumerated and guaranteed in
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights, the freedoms merely "recognized and
declared" in Section 1 were declaratory only and were not intended
to repeal existing inconsistent legislation. Hence the defendant's
appeal must be refused. It should be noted that the case of Richards
v. Cote18 is directly contrary to the judgment of Davey J.A. with
regard to the ability of Section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights to nullify
inconsistent portions of previously enacted legislation, but the Cote
decision is itself against the weight of authority on this point and
is not entitled to much attention.19
I should say that I think both the opinions of the Court in the
GonzaZes case express correct interpretations of the Bill of Rights but
I find the judicial method of the majority slightly preferable in
choosing to construe the words of the Act to reach their result rather
than decide the broader question of the effect of Section 1 of the
statute on existing Dominion legislation.
Right to Counsel
I turn now to a discussion of the cases involving the admissibility
of evidence and the validity of convictions obtained through denials
of the right to counsel guaranteed under Section 2(c) (ii) of the
Bill of Rights. The Section gives to "a person who has been arrested
or detained . . . the right to retain and instruct counsel without
delay".
One of two key decisions thus far in this field is R. v. Steeves.2 0
Steeves was taken to a police station on a charge of leaving the
scene of an automobile accident, his counsel being present with him
at the station. He was then escorted into a separate room for in-
terrogation. His counsel sought to accompany him but was denied
permission to do so by the police. An interrogation then ensued in
which Steeves voluntarily disclosed the name of a witness to the
accident later used against him at his trial. The magistrate, after
hearing all the evidence, dismissed the charge against Steeves on
17 Similar legislation has been upheld in the United States. See United
States v. Nice (1916), 241 U.S. 591, where a federal statute making it a crime
to sell liquor to an Indian either on or off his reservation was sustained
against constitutional challenge. The majority opinion in the Gonzales case
cites this decision and, I think, borrows much of its reasoning.
18 (1962), 40 W.W.R. 340 (Sask. Dist. Ct.).19 Schmeiser, op. cit., p. 44.
20 Supra, footnote 11.
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the ground that the securing of the name of an adverse witness
through procedures violating Section 2(c) (ii) of the Bill of Rights
vitiated the conviction. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court
of Nova Scotia, which held unanimously that the decision below
should be reversed.
Two judges held that Section 2 (c) (ii) of the Bill of Rights,
even assuming it was violated, did not prevent the defendant from
being convicted, since there was and is, they declared, no bar in
Canada to the admission in a criminal trial of evidence given volun-
tarily by an accused, although under circumstances impairing his
right to consult counsel or to have counsel present during an in-
terrogation.
The third member of the Court, Coffin J., concurred in the result
but on wholly different grounds. He asserted that Section 2(c) (ii)
of the Bill of Rights was not infringed at all since, the defendant,
not being a compellable witness, could lawfully have refused to make
any statement, and thus the need-and the right-to have counsel
present disappeared. With all respect I. find this argument difficult to
accept, for it is precisely to apprise the accused, inter alia, of his
privilege of remaining silent that the right to counsel at a pre-trial
stage of a criminal proceeding is deemed so vital.
Coffin J. went on, however, to indicate his approval of the
majority's view that Section 2(c) (ii) of the Bill of Rights was not
intended to nullify convictions based on evidence obtained in con-
travention of its terms. But he further commented, in an interesting
dictum, that the remedy which the Bill did contemplate was a civil
action and that Steeves had a right to have evidence taken at his
trial on the issue whether or not a Section 2(c) (ii) violation had
occurred.
So much, then, for the Steeves decision. It is fascinating to
observe that the Court treated the Bill of Rights as applicable,
although, so far as I can see, no "law of Canada" in the sense intended
by the Bill was involved and certainly none was discussed. 21 It is
plain, however, despite the Court's probably unwarranted application
of the Bill, that the ironical effect of the Steeves holding is to utterly
emasculate the very Section applied. For even if Coffin .'s view
prevails and a civil action is permitted, this is hardly comforting
to the man already serving his sentence; nor, if experience in the
United States is any guide, is it likely to deter those responsible for
law enforcement from pursuing illegal methods. For this reason I
find the result of the Steeves decision, and the entire state of the
law on this matter, extremely disquieting.22
21 See supra, pp. 4, 5. It is judicial doctrine, and not a statute, which
governs the question in Canada whether illegally obtained evidence Is
admissible at a criminal trial. E.g., Attorney-General for Quebec v. B6gin,[1955] 5 D.L.R. 394 (S.C.C.), mentioned infra, p. 45.
22 See infra, p. 45.
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Before considering briefly the position in the United States on
this question, however, it is interesting to examine the attempt,
albeit an abortive one, made by the Ontario High Court to retreat
from the Steeves doctrine. In R. v. O'Connor,23 the defendant was
stopped by a policeman while driving and escorted to a police station.
As the Court elected to treat the facts, he was at that time under
arrest, although he had not yet been informed by the police of this
circumstance.24 Still believing himself to be unarrested, the defendant
willingly submitted to two breathalyzer tests which disclosed the
presence of .2% alcohol in his bloodstream. At this point the de-
fendant was told he was under arrest. He immediately asked to
be allowed to make a telephone call to his solicitor and, receiving the
assent of the police, did so. The solicitor was away, however, and
the defendant requested permission to make another call in an
effort to obtain counsel. This time the police refused. At the trial,
evidence of the results of the two breathalyzer tests was admitted
and the defendant convicted. The case then came by way of appeal
as a stated case to the Ontario High Court.
That Court unanimously held that the conviction should be set
aside. The fact that the denial of counsel occurred after the breath-
alyzer tests were administered was irrelevant, said the Court, owing
to the failure of the police to inform the defendant that he was under
arrest. Had he been so informed, the Court did not doubt that he
would have requested counsel prior to submitting to the breathalyzer
tests.
The chief problem still confronting the Court was the Steeves
decision and this the Court proceeded to distinguish away. In Steeves,
the Court pointed out, the evidence obtained (i.e. the name of an
adverse witness) was 'objective'; its truth and reality were in-
dependent of any violation of the rights of the accused. Here, on the
other hand, the weight to be given to the breathalyzer readings de-
pended to a large degree upon possibly fallible apparatus and per-
sonal observation. The Court concluded, therefore, that owing to the
denial of counsel "at a crucial stage" the defendant was prevented
from having a skilled legal advisor present who might have found
some flaw in the breathalyzer equipment or who might have advo-
cated the taking of a blood test which would have proved the lack
of alcohol in the defendant's system. The Court hence remanded the
case for retrial absent the breathalyzer data.
25
23 Supra, footnote 11.
24 It is rather odd, to my mind, that this view should have been taken.
I had always considered it to be universal common law doctrine (although
I could find no Canadian authority on the point) that for a criminal arrest
to be valid, the intent to arrest must be communicated to the arrestee. See
"Arrest", Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 1(b), pp. 571-73; cf. Christie v. Leachin-
sky, [1947] A.C. 573 (grounds of arrest made without a warrant must be
communicated). However, the matter is academic, as nothing hinges on
whether the initial "arrest" was in fact proper; any defect was cured as soon
as the police informed the defendant that he was under arrest. See Christie
v. Leachinsky, supra.
25 For a similar holding, see R?. v. Gray (1962), 132 C.C.C. 337.
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As an alternative holding, moreover, the Court indicated that the
Bill of Rights must have been intended to render inadmissible any
evidence obtianed in violation of its Section 2 provisions. It was in-
conceivable, urged the Court, that no remedy was intended to be
available, yet no tort could be impliedly created to give redress for
a breach of the Bill's provisions, as was suggested by Coffin J. in the
Steeves decision, since this would be to invade the exclusive com-
petence of the provinces to legislate on the subject of "Property
and Civil Rights". 26 Thus to declare inadmissible evidence acquired
in violation of Section 2 of the Bill was the only way to give effect
to the rights there laid down.
It is hard not to sympathize with the overall result the High
Court was seeking to achieve in the O'Connor case,27 but at the same
time it must be conceded that the distinction employed by the Court
to circumvent the Steeves decision is not a worthwhile one. The
difference between objective and non-objective sorts of evidence is
not at all easy to perceive (indeed on the facts in the O'Connor case
I would have thought that breathalyzer data fell within the former
category); nor, more significantly, is it useful in determining whether
to admit the evidence obtained. The High Court's theory seems to
have been that counsel may have been of real assistance to a de-
fendant only where the evidence elicited from him was of the non-
objective variety. This completely disregards the possibility that had
counsel been present, he might have advised his client to decline to
answer any police questions or submit to any proposed tests, in which
event the police would get no evidence whatever from their prisoner.
In light of its rather weak analysis, therefore, it is perhaps
not too much to be regretted that the holding of the High Court
in the O'Connor decision was itself overturned, and the conviction
reinstated, by the Ontario Court of Appeal.28 That Court rejected
outright the distinction of the Steeves case below and further held
that the question whether evidence obtained in violation of Section
26 B.N.A. Act, s. 92(13). Whether Dominion legislation under the
criminal law power may constitutionally be held to give rise to a civil action
for injuries resulting from unlawful conduct thereunder has never been
determined by a Canadian Court. There are only scattered dicta, for and
against this proposition, such as those found in the Steeves and O'Connor
decisions. See, e.g., F/oyd v. Edmonton City Dairy Ltd., [1935] 1 D.L.R. 754(Alta S.C.) (for) and Gordon v. Imperial Tobacco Sales, [1939] 2 D.L.R.
27 (Ont. H.C.) (against). Personally I see no reason why, under normal pith
and substance principles, civil actions ought not to be allowed to be created
by the Dominion even if done expressly. The test could be, of course, whether
such actions were incidental and necessary to the dominant criminal law
aspects of the legislation. Cf. R. v. Chief (1964), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 712 (Man.Q.B.) (Manitoba Child Welfare Act section making it an offense punishable
by up to five years' imprisonment to neglect a child upheld under B.N.A.
Act, s. 92(15), since the main object of the legislation as a whole was to
secure proper treatment for children.) If the provinces can, in the course of
valid civil rights enactments expressly create a crime as an incidental aid
to the scheme of enforcement, then why may not the Dominion do likewise,
vis.&-vis a civil proceeding, in the context of a criminal statute?
27 If, that is, one accepts that the Bill should have been applied at all.
See discussion supra, pp. 38, 42, 43.
28 (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 106.
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2 (c) (ii) of the Bill of Rights was admissible in a criminal proceeding
had been settled in principle some years ago by the Supreme Court
decision of Attorney-General for Quebec v. B~gin.2 9 There it had been
stated, in a strong dictum30 that evidence obtained illegally but volun-
tarily was not thereby rendered inadmissible in a criminal trial, as
there was no reason to doubt its veracity. Nothing in the Bill of
Rights itself, the Court of Appeal noted, made this general pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court inapplicable. However, the Ontario
Court did leave open the possibility that in circumstances disclosing
an "abuse of [the] system of criminal justice", (not defined except
to say that malice was an essential element thereof), evidence unlaw-
fully acquired might be deemed incompetent.
Thus the upshot of the Steeves and O'Connor decisions, as
stated before, is that the Bill of Rights has been almost totally
emasculated as to the Section 2(c) (ii) guarantees. 31 I consider these
holdings and the dictum of the Supreme Court in the Bdgin case to
be extremely unfortunate and the result of the Canadian courts
paying too much attention to the fact whether the illegally obtained
evidence sought to be admitted is reliable and not enough to other
policy factors such as the deterring of unlawful police practices.
32
The situation in the United States, by way of contrast, is one
of complete opposition to the Canadian cases. In a long line of de-
cisions culminating only recently in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 3 the Supreme
Court has held that the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees to an
"accused" the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence" also carries with it the right to have any conviction quashed
which is based upon evidence obtained in circumstances constituting
a violation of the Amendment. 34 Thus it can be seen from this
case-and others'-that the Supreme Court of the United States
has come round to the view that in criminal proceedings it is less
important that the accused occasionally receives the benefit of an
unmerited acquittal than that state and federal law enforcement
officers be encouraged to accord to prisoners their constitutional
29 Supra, footnote 21.
30 Ibid., at pp. 396, 397.
31 Furthermore there appears to be no barrier to the extension of the
rationale of these cases to instances involving evidence secured through
infringement of other Section 2 rights as well. See, e.g., Sections 2(a)(arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile), 2(b) (imposition of cruel or
unusual punishment), and 2(c) (i) (right to be informed promptly of reason
for arrest or detention).
32 For a similar criticism, see the brief article by A. M. Harradence,
Truth or Consequences (1962), 2 Alta L. Rev. 5.
33 (1964), 378 U.S. 478.
34 Interestingly enough, the facts in Escobedo were nearly identical to
those in Steeves, (save that the charge in Escobedo was murder), the de-
fendant's lawyer being with Escobedo at the police station and the police
refusing to let him be consulted until after they had interrogated the de-
fendant and elicited damning admissions of his involvement in the crime.
35 The same exclusionary rule of evidence aljplies to coerced confessions
regardless of their truth, Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368, and to the
fruits of illegal searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643,
overruling Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 338 U.S. 25.
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rights. The Escobedo case, moreover, may not be the end of con-
stitutional interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in favor of de-
fendants. Owing to some broad language in the Court's opinion, other
federal and state tribunals are currently engaged in determining
whether the full import of the Escobedo holding may be to place an
affirmative obligation upon the police to inform an arrested or de-
tained person of his right to counsel and to remain silent before under-
taking any interrogation. And one court of appeal, as well as one
highly respected state court, have already so held.3 6 I believe these
decisions to be desirable, particularly in the context of American
police practice, and would urge that it is time for the Canadian courts,
if not to emulate the American rule, at least to carefully re-examine
their position.
Freedom of Religion
The final part of this paper concerns freedom of religion as
protected by Section 1(c) of the Bill of Rights. Here we encounter
what seems to be the first case decided under the Bill of Rights by
the Supreme Court of Canada, Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen.37
The facts were simple. The defendants were convicted in the courts
below of operating a bowling alley on a Sunday in contravention of
the Dominion Lord's Day Act.38 They contended on appeal that
Section 1(c) of the Bill of Rights had repealed or rendered in-
effective that statute.
The majority, however, consisting of all but one of the Supreme
Court, sustained the conviction. They concluded that the Bill of
Rights was not infringed, as there was no conflict between the "free-
dom of religion" therein declared and the effect 39 or operation of the
Lord's Day Act. The Court reasoned that the intent of the Bill of
Rights had not been to alter any formerly existing statutory pro-
visions but only to preserve the rights and freedoms laid down in the
Bill as they existed at the date of its enactment. Moreover on that
date, said the Court, freedom of religion in Canada encompassed
generally the right to believe and to practice one's belief. The Lord's
Day Act did not encroach upon this freedom; it merely established
a duty not to do business on Sundays, a duty which the majority
conceived of as financial in character, not as a restriction upon the
ability to exercise freely one's religion.
Alone of the Court, Cartwright J., dissenting, saw the Act as
compelling the observance of a religious day not shared by those
of all faiths.
36 United States ex reZ. Russo 'v. New Jersey (1965), F. 2d (3d Clr.);
People v. Dorado (1965), 398 P. 2d 361 (Sup. Ct. Calif.).
37 Supra, footnote 6.
38 R.S.C. 1952, c. 171.
39 That the Court looked to the effect of the Lord's Day Act rather
than, as is customary, to its purpose is the basis for one of the many criti-
cisms of the Rosetanni judgment in Godfrey, Freedom of Religion and the
Canadian Bill of Rights (1964), 22 U of T Fac. L. Rev. 60.
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Though the Rosetanni case throws a large and seemingly
quiescent body of Canadian law into a turmoil,40 I find it hard to
differ with the result it reached. For undoubtedly much benefit to
society springs from having a common day of rest from commercial
activities. And while it is true that the Lord's Day Act imposes a
heavy burden on such people as Orthodox Jews, who are forbidden
under the tenets of their religion from working on Saturdays and
who are thus forced by the Act to a choice between their pocketbooks
and their beliefs, it is a persuasive testimonial to the correctness of
the policy determination implicit in the Court's decision that the
United States Supreme Court, using a balancing-of-interests approach,
has likewise only recently upheld legislation of the Lord's Day type
against First Amendment challenge.41 I cannot but concur, therefore,
with the holding that the Lord's Day Act is not in conflict with "free-
dom of religion", however much confusion in other areas of Canadian
law is caused by this pronouncement.
Finally we come to the case of R. v. Leach ex parte Bergsma,42
a product of the Ontario High Court. Although this case has been
reversed,43 it is useful to consider it in light of the Court's discussion
of the meaning of religious freedom assured to all persons under the
Bill of Rights.
The facts were that an atheist seeking naturalization was denied
Canadian citizenship by an examining magistrate solely for refusing
to speak the words "So help me God" incorporated in the oath of
allegiance required to be uttered by the Canadian Citizenship Act.44
The applicant appealed, alleging that the refusal to grant him citizen-
ship on this basis violated both the Canada Evidence Act,45 which
permits a "solemn affirmation" in lieu of an oath where a person
declines to be sworn on grounds of "conscientious scruples", and the
"freedom of religion" guaranteed by Section 1 (c) of the Bill of Rights.
After dismissing the appellant's arguments relating to the Canada
Evidence Act, the High Court (Schatz J.) dealt with the remaining
contention under the Bill of Rights. The Court held, following the
dictum in the Rosetanni case,46 that the Bill of Rights was not in-
tended to alter existing statutory rights but only to preserve them
40 The judgment, sustaining the Lord's Day Act while deciding that it
is chiefly commercial in its operation, contradicts the rationales of several
previous Supreme Court and Privy Council cases, e.g., A.-G. for Ontario v.
Hamilton Street Railway, [1903] A C. 524; Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v.
A..G. for Manitoba, [1925] A.C. 384; and Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v.
A.-G. for BritisL Columbia, [1959] S.C.R. 497, which had seemed to establish
that Dominion Lord's Day legislation was valid, as being under the criminal
law power, only assuming it was enacted primarily from a religious rather
than a commercial aspect. See also In re Legislation Respecting Abstentionfrom Labour on Sunday (1905), 35 S.C.R. 581, at p. 592.41 E.g., McGowan v. Maryand (1961), 366 U.S. 420; Braunfeld v. Brown
(1961), 366 U.S. 599. Moreover the Braunfele case involved an Orthodox Jew.
Note too Sherbert v. Verner (1963), 374 U.S. 398.
42 Supra, footnote 6.
43 Ibid.
44 R.S.C. 1952, c. 33.
45 R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 15(1).
46 Supra, p. 46.
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and that under the Canadian Citizenship Act it was a permissible
exercise of discretion to refuse to grant an applicant naturalization
who declined to comply with one of the Act's stated requirements,
i.e., the taking of the oath there set forth. This, be it noticed, was
sufficient to dispose of the matter before the Court. However, the
Court chose not to stop there and went on to say that in addition to
the Bill of Rights not being capable of superseding the clear pro-
visions of the Canadian Citizenship Act, it was in any event not
applicable to the appellant's claim, since the term "freedom of re-
ligion" in Section 1(c) had no application to one who rejects the
existence of a "divine ruling power". 47
To me this is an outrageous pronouncement and the fact that
the preamble to the Bill of Rights, as the Court noted, recites that
the "Canadian Nation is founded upon principles that acknowledge
the supremacy of God" by no means establishes the Court's interpreta-
tion as the correct one. The state may praise, even advocate, religious
observance; but that does not imply that its law guaranteeing "free-
dom of religion" should be taken as excluding those whose choice
respecting religion is no religion at all. Indeed to begin with it is
a quite telling comparison against the High Court's view that the
very similar language of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution-"Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;"4 8 -has
long been held to afford protection to atheists and agnostics. 49
Furthermore the Bill of Rights as enacted extends the guarantee of
"freedom of religion" in what is undoubtedly a Christian society50
to Buddhists, Taoists and Zoroastrian believers alike, though pre-
sumably it is not the policy of Canada to foster the spread of non-
Christian religions within her borders. The question which must be
asked, therefore, is: could Parliament, given this fact, have intended
to deny a similar protection to atheists and agnostics? I submit
not and I find it incredible that the High Court was prepared, in the
47 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 127.48 Italics mine.
49 E.g. McCollum v. Bd. of Education (1948), 333 U.S. 203 (Illinois law
providing for the dissemination of religious doctrines on public school
premises held unconstitutional on the challenge of the atheistic parents of
a child then in the Illinois public school system); Torcaso v. Watkins (1961),
367 U.S. 488 (state law requiring a declaration of belief in the existence ofGod as a prerequisite to holding public office held unconstitutional on the suit
of an agnostic seeking to occupy the office of notary public.
The First Amendment has been held applicable to the states as being
incorporated into the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), 310 U.S. 296. In addition, for a case very close
on its facts to P.. v. Leach, see Girouard v. United States (1946), 328 U.S. 61,
where the Court decided that the Immigration and Nationality Act's require-
ment that an applicant for citizenship declare himself ready to "support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, . . ." does not require a willingness to take
up arms. The plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist opposed on religious
grounds to combatant duty.
50 As the examining magistrate in the Leach case observed. See hisinterchange of views with the appellant, reported in R.. v. Leach, ex parte
Bergsma (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 114, at p. 116 (Ont. H.C.).
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event that the Bill of Rights had been deemed capable of overruling
existing statutory provisions inconsistent with its terms, to hold that
so precious a thing as citizenship should be withheld on account of
a non-belief in God from a man who admittedly met all the other
requisites for naturalization. The word "religion" of course is sus-
ceptible of bearing the narrower meaning attributed to it by the
Court, as well as the broader one which I am advocating. But in de-
ciding which meaning to adopt the Court might well have remembered
that it was not a dictionary which it was expounding (the Court
actually placed great reliance on the dictionary definition of "re-
ligion") but a Bill of Rights in which the evident aim of the legis-
lature to safeguard certain freedoms is paramount.
Thus it is not to be lamented that, as I stated earlier, the Leach
decision has been reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. However,
in reversing the High Court the Court of Appeal left untouched the
unfortunate dictum of Schatz J. regarding the inapplicability of
Section 1(c) of the Bill of Rights to one who has no belief in the
existence of a "divine ruling power". This resulted from the fact
that the Court of Appeal based its reversal on the grounds that the
Canada Evidence Act and the nearly identical language of the Ontario
Evidence Act,51 gave the appellant a right to substitute a "solemn
affirmation" in lieu of the oath seemingly required by the Canadian
Citizenship Act. The Court held that the term "conscientious.
scruples" should be broadly interpreted to include the case of an
atheist as well as one whose refusal to swear was founded upon a
religious conviction against uttering the name of the Deity. The
Court did mention the Bill of Rights but only to say that it was in-
applicable in view of its prior holding and Section 5(1) of the Bill,
which preserves "any human right or fundamental freedom not
enumerated therein that may have existed in Canada at the com-
mencement of this Act". The right to affirm instead of taking the oath
existed, the Court said, at the commencement of the Bill.
The upshot of the Court of Appeal's decision is to leave neither
strengthened nor diminished the dictum of Schatz J. to the effect that
the Bill of Rights' guarantee of "freedom of religion" does not extend
to atheists. What damage this dictum may cause from its current
position in limbo remains to be seen. In view of the error of law, on
a serious matter of statutory construction, which to my mind the
dictum embodies, I feel the Court of Appeal was wrong in failing
expressly to disavow it.52
51 R.S.O. 1960, c. 125, ss. 18(1) and (2), made applicable, the Court
indicated, by operation of the Dominion Oaths of Allegiance Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 197, s. 5.
52 On the other hand I do not wish to be understood as implying that
the Court should have predicated its reversal of the decision below on the
Bill of Rights. To do this, the Court would have had to hold that the Bill
of Rights was capable of superseding the provisions of prior legislation. And
such a holding of course would have been contrary to the great majority
of Canadian cases. See supra, footnote 6.
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Here I end this discussion, except for some concluding comments
regarding the efficacy in general of the Canadian Bill of Rights
and the need for further development in Canada in this area.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the Canadian Bill of Rights has most often been
construed as a measure designed simply to aid in the interpretative
process whenever ambiguity with respect to the rights it lays down
appears on the face of another enactment. 53 Apart, therefore, from
the marginal circumstances in which it can be invoked, the Bill in
reality confers no rights at all and contains few if any safeguards
against governmental abridgment of personal liberties. To be sure,
the Bill has accomplished some good, both through its initial en-
deavor to enumerate and define which rights and freedoms deserve
to be protected against legislative or executive invasion and through
the healthful litigious controversy regarding certain facets of those
rights which it has engendered. But it remains in my view to go
much further.
It may be, of course, that the Dominion Parliament has already
gone as far as it constitutionally can in passing the Bill of Rights
in its present form, in light of the exclusive reservation to the
provinces in Section 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act of the power to pass
laws on the subjects of "Property and Civil Rights".54 But even
supposing that the Dominion's limit in this field has been reached,
the possibility remains of the Canadian people incorporating into their
Constitution a Bill of Rights along the lines of the American and
I would urge that this be done.
It is a fallacy, assuming a reasonable amendment procedure,
to believe that a constitutional Bill of Rights must function as a
strait-jacket impeding the development of human rights; indeed
the experience in the United States demonstrates the large poten-
tialities for growth inherent in such a document. Moreover, I submit,
only by having one can Canadians rest assured that their civil
liberties will not at some future date be impaired by provincial or
Dominion legislation.
For it is well to remember-lest it be thought that Canadians
stand in no need of such protection from their legislators-that in
Canada, as in other democratic countries, law makers are subservient
to popular opinion and may in times of social stress and passion allow
themselves to ride roughshod over the interests and freedoms of
a few in their desire to please, or appease, the many. One example
taken from history is the not so long ago repealed British Columbia
statute upheld in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma,55 prohibiting any
53 Though as stated before, the effect of the Bill-and especially of
Section 2-has still to be definitively established. See supra, p. 37 and foot-
note 6.
54 See Rinfret C.J.C., Kerwin and Taschereau JJ. in Saumur 'v. City ofQuebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 4 D.L.R. 641; and see supra, footnote 2.
55 [1903] A.C. 151.
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Chinaman, Japanese or Indian, whether naturalized or not, from
voting in a provincial election.5 6 One would like to think that today
such a law not only would but could not be validly enacted. But
prejudices remain, the future is uncertain, and without a constitu-
tional Bill of Rights to provide a higher law to bind the governments
of the provinces and the Dominion the courts would be helpless to
prevent such a statute from being applied. It is for this reason, I
hold, that Canada needs a constitutional Bill of Rights, and needs
one badly.57
Appendix
The Canadian Bill of Rights
8-9 Elizabeth II
Chapter 44
An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.
The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian Nation is founded
upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God, the dignity and
worth of the human person and the position of the family in a society of
free men and free institutions;
Affirming also that men and institutions remain free only when freedom
is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law;
And being desirous of enshrining these principles and the human rights
and fundamental freedoms derived from them, in a Bill of Rights which shall
reflect the respect of Parliament for its constitutional authority and which
shall ensure the protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada:
THEREFORE Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
PART I
BILL OF RIGHTS
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental
freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and
enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except
by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection
of the law;
(c) freedom of religion;
(d) freedom of speech;(e) freedom of assembly and association; and(f) freedom of the press.
56 Another, to some minds, might be the Dominion Order sustained in the
notorious Japanese Canadians Deportation case, [19461 S.C.R. 248, aff'd,[19471 A.C. 87.
57 My judgment is not altered by the fact that in the area of freedom
of speech and discussion the courts may be themselves developing a doctrine
-based upon the declaration in the B.N.A. Act that the Canadian Constitu-
tion is "similar in principle" to that of the United Kingdom-whereby to in-
validate both provincial and Dominion legislation purporting to restrict un-
duly its exercise. See the dictum of Abbott 3. in Switzman v. Elbling and
Attorney-General of Quebec, [19571 S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337, at p. 371.
This is a development (should it ever become law) of limited scope, in no
way detracting from the general need in Canada for an entrenched Bill of
Rights.
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2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of RAghts, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringment
of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in
particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to(a) authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of
any person;(b) impose or authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment;(c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained(i) of his right to be informed promptly of the reason for his arrest
or detention,(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, or
(iii) of the remedy by way of habeas corpus for the determination of the
validity of his detention and for his release if the detention is not
lawful;
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority to
compel a person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, protection
against self crimination or other constitutional safeguards;
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights
and obligations;(f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right
to reasonable bail without just cause; or
(g) deprive a person of the right to the assistance of an interpreter in any
proceedings in which he is involved or in which he is a party or a
witness, before a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does
not understand or speak the language in which such proceedings are
conducted.
3. The Minister of Justice shall, in accordance with such regulations as may
be prescribed by the Governor in Council, examine every proposed regulation
submitted in draft form to the Clerk of the Privy Council pursuant to the
ReguZations Act and every Bill introduced in or presented to the House of
Commons, in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are
inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this Part and he shall
report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons at the first con-
venient opportunity.
4. The provisions of this Part shall be known as the Canadian Bill of Rights.
PART II
5. (1) Nothing in Part I shall be construed to abrogate or abridge any
human right or fundamental freedom not enumerated therein that may have
existed in Canada at the commencement of this Act.
(2) The expression 'law of Canada' in Part I means an Act of the
Parliament of Canada enacted before or after the coming into force of this
Act, any order, rule or regulation thereunder, and any law in force in Canada
or in any part of Canada at the commencement of this Act that is subject
to be repealed, abolished or altered by the Parliament of Canada.(3) The provisions of Part I shall be construed as extending only to
matters coming within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.
6. Section 6 of the War Measures Act is repealed and the following sub.
stituted therefor:
"6. (1) Sections 3, 4, and 5 shall come into force only upon the issue of a
proclamation of the Governor in Council declaring that war, invasion or
insurrection, real or apprehended, exists.
(2) A proclamation declaring that war, invasion or insurrection, real
or apprehended, exists shall be laid before Parliament forthwith after Its
issue, or, if Parliament is then not sitting, within the first fifteen days next
thereafter that Parliament is sitting.(3) Where a proclamation has been laid before Parliament pursuant
to subsection (2), a notice of motion in either House signed by ten members
thereof and made in accordance with the rules of that House within ten
days of the day the proclamation was laid before Parliament, praying
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that the proclamation be revoked, shall be debated in that House at the first
convenient opportunity within the four sitting days next after the day the
motion in that House was made.(4) If both Houses of Parliament resolve that the proclamation be
revoked, it shall cease to have effect, and sections 3, 4 and 5 shall cease to be
in force until those sections are again brought into force by a further procla-
mation but without prejudice to the previous operation of those sections or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder or any offence committed or any
penalty or forfeiture or punishment incurred.(5) Any Act or thing done or authorized or any order or regulation
made under the authority of this Act, shall be deemed not to be an abrogation,
abridgement or infringement of any right or freedom recognized by the
Canadian Bill of Rights."
